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AFSAC: 60/42

24 November 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF AFSAC:

Subject: Division of Responsibility Between Armed Forces
Security Agency and the Military Services

Reference: J.C.S. 2010/22 (similar to AFSAC 60/41)

1. The attached report by the Director, AFSA, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the above subject has been prepared as indicated in J.C.S. 2010/22.

2. The Director, AFSA, expects to submit this report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on or before 15 December 1950, together with any comments or expressions of concurrence which the members of AFSAC may wish to have accompany it.

3. The Director, AFSA, will welcome an opportunity to confer with any member of AFSAC desiring to discuss this report prior to submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



EARL E. STONE
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Director, Armed Forces Security Agency

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~~TOP SECRET~~REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR, ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY
AND THE MILITARY SERVICESReference: a. J.C.S. 2010 SeriesTHE PROBLEM

1. In accordance with instructions from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to seek a basis for resolving a fundamental difference of view between the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) and the Air Force with regard to the responsibility for the conduct of centralized communication intelligence (COMINT) processing* within the continental United States, in order that the operation and development of AFSA and the Service cryptologic agencies may proceed smoothly in accordance with the intent of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in the best interests of the national defense.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

2. A duplication of AFSA operations, which, in the opinion of the Director, AFSA, is at variance with both the spirit and the letter of basic directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now exists in the case of certain COMINT processing by the Air Force Security Service (AFSS) at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. The situation raises basic questions of responsibility and authority which will affect the future development of AFSA and the Service cryptologic agencies. An early authoritative decision is of vital importance. Further facts bearing on the problem and the principal considerations involved are discussed in Enclosure "B".

CONCLUSIONS

3. It is concluded that:

a. The AFSS is conducting centralized COMINT processing, within the continental United States, of certain foreign air communication traffic for production of essentially the same information produced by AFSA from the same traffic.

*Note: For the purpose of this Report: "Centralized COMINT processing" is defined as the series of operations which, by traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, and other appropriate methods, reduces intercepted communication traffic, from two or more separate intercept sources, to an intelligible and usable form for intelligence purposes. It does not include the synthesis or evaluation of the results of such operations.

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b. AFSA's mission requires that AFSA process this communication traffic in order (i) to produce therefrom such information as it may contain for dissemination, not only to the Air Force, but also to the other Services, and (ii) to provide technical support for COMINT activities of all three Services.

c. Centralized COMINT processing within the continental United States by the Air Force is an unnecessary duplication of AFSA operations because:

(1) The raw material which is utilized in this processing is also being processed by AFSA;

(2) The information which this processing provides Air Force Commanders can be provided by AFSA with no increase in time lag;

(3) The technical support which this processing provides AFSS activities can be provided by AFSA with no reduction in quality and quantity.

d. Centralized COMINT processing within the continental United States by the Air Force is undesirable duplication because:

(1) It is contrary to the intent of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff in establishing and organizing AFSA, and constitutes a precedent which other Services might follow in establishing similar activities;

(2) It creates a requirement for critical personnel which competes needlessly with that of AFSA;

(3) It imposes additional burdens upon AFSA, and adds complications to AFSA operations by creating additional requirements for traffic exchange, technical support, and communications;

(4) Expansion of this processing, and the undertaking of similar processing by other Services, would lead to the growth of three large Service COMINT agencies and one joint agency in the United States, with overlapping responsibilities, competing requirements, and reduced over-all effectiveness.

e. Assignment to AFSA of sole responsibility for all centralized COMINT processing in the continental United States will eliminate this duplication and ensure a strong and fully integrated COMINT effort for the benefit of all three Services, as well as other authorized governmental recipients of COMINT.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is therefore recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

a. Note and approve the above conclusions.

b. Issue the directive contained in Enclosure "A".

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~~TOP SECRET~~ENCLOSURE "A"D R A F TDIRECTIVE FOR THE DIRECTOR, ARMED FORCES SECURITY AGENCY

1. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the Secretary of Defense in his directive of 20 May 1949 (Enclosure and Appendix to J.C.S. 2010), and with specific reference to paragraphs 2 a., 3 c. (2), and 3 d. (6) and (7) of the Appendix to the Enclosure to J.C.S. 2010 and to paragraph 5 a. (2) of Enclosure "B" to J.C.S. 2010/6, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have determined that, in the interest of economy, efficiency, and over-all effectiveness, centralized communication intelligence (COMINT) processing in the continental United States for the production of communication intelligence, and for the provision of technical support to the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the conduct of their cryptologic activities, is a sole responsibility of the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA). ("Centralized COMINT processing" is defined as the series of operations which, by traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, and other appropriate methods, reduces intercepted communication traffic, from two or more separate intercept sources, to an intelligible and usable form for intelligence purposes. It does not include the synthesis ^{or} ~~and~~ evaluation of the results of such operations).

2. Accordingly, the personnel and facilities engaged in centralized COMINT processing at the Headquarters, Air Force Security Service (AFSS), are declared to be engaged in cryptologic activities which are a sole responsibility of AFSA. The AFSS will therefore discontinue these activities.

3. The Director, AFSA, will report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by 1 April 1951, the action taken in implementation of this directive.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION

1. The formation of AFSA was ordered by the Secretary of Defense (on the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) after the question of integrating COMINT activities of the National Military Establishment had been studied and reported on by "The Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security Agency". In establishing AFSA, the Secretary adopted in principle the consolidation advocated by the Army members, whose views were summarized in the special committee's report as follows:

"The Army has reached the following Fundamental Conclusion:

"The most efficient direction and maximum exploitation requires that the responsibility for all communication intelligence tasks OTHER THAN THE PERFORMANCE OF INTERCEPT AND DECENTRALIZED FIELD PROCESSING* be fixed within a single organization."

2. The directive establishing AFSA is the Enclosure to J.C.S. 2010 and the Appendix thereto. The Joint Chiefs of Staff subsequently promulgated (in J.C.S. 2010/6) charters for the Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC) and the Director, AFSA, and issued a directive (Enclosure "A" with J.C.S. 2010/10) to the Director, AFSA, with respect to the specific cryptologic facilities and personnel to be consolidated in AFSA. These directives and charters constitute the organic documents for AFSA.

3. The above-mentioned directives assign AFSA the mission of providing:

a. "Authentic information for planners and policy makers within the National Military Establishment and other Governmental Agencies having membership on the United States Communication Intelligence Board; to apprise them of the realities of the international situation, war-making capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions of foreign countries, and to eliminate the element of surprise from an act of aggression by another country." (Paragraph 4a.(1) of Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2010/6)

b. "The unique information essential to the several services for the successful prosecution of war and vital to a shortening of the period of hostilities." (Paragraph 4a. (2) of Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 2010/6)

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Enclosure "B"

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c. "Technical support to the Army, Navy, and Air Force in their conduct of cryptologic activities." (Paragraph 3 c. (14) of Appendix to Enclosure to J.C.S. 2010).

d. "Certain specialized training of personnel to meet the respective needs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force." (Paragraph 3 c. (11) of Appendix to Enclosure to J.C.S. 2010).

Fulfillment of this mission requires that AFSA process all procurable foreign communication traffic.

4. The directives authorize the individual Services to conduct such COMINT processing as is needed for control of their intercept facilities and for production of combat intelligence of operational interest to them; but the directives explicitly enjoin that their processing activities must not entail undesirable duplication of AFSA's processing, and that the Services are not to undertake any COMINT activities determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be the sole responsibility of AFSA. In addition, the directives provide that economy and efficiency are to be stressed, and that the Director, AFSA, will be kept fully informed of the cryptologic activities of the Services and will report when, in his opinion, Service activities represent an unnecessary duplication of AFSA operations, or are otherwise at variance with the spirit or the letter of the basic directives.

5. The AFSS has established certain COMINT activities at Brooks Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas, and has initiated an expanded program for its COMINT operations. The Director, AFSA, has examined the activities and the program, and has concluded that some of the operations conducted and planned by the Air Force represent unnecessary duplication of the COMINT processing required of, and actually performed by, AFSA pursuant to its assigned mission.

6. The duplication results from the fact that the AFSS is now carrying out at Brooks Air Force Base a centralized processing operation consisting of the traffic analysis and low-level cryptanalysis of Russian military air and air defense traffic. Approximately 200 persons are already directly engaged in this operation, and a larger number will ultimately be so engaged if the expanded program as presented to the Director, AFSA, is implemented. The raw traffic for this operation is obtained from AFSS mobile intercept units located in various parts of the world. These units are supplying the same material to AFSA.

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7. The Director of Intelligence, U.S. Air Force, has advised the Director, AFSA, that:

"The purpose of the operational processing at Headquarters, Air Force Security Service is to provide Air Force Commanders with vital, timely combat information. Such processing will be limited to the integration of traffic analysis of the field units and of such cryptanalysis and traffic analysis as would be exploitable in the field through the increased depth which the integration of the product of two or more field units provides."

In addition, the Air Force has maintained that this centralized COMINT processing in the continental United States must be carried out to provide back-up for AFSS field activities and to accomplish necessary training of COMINT personnel for duty in the field.

8. At the time of the formation of AFSA, centralized COMINT processing in the continental United States was conducted for the Armed Forces in two establishments, the Headquarters, Army Security Agency, Arlington Hall Station, Virginia, and the Navy Communications Supplementary Activity, Washington, D.C. Traffic analysis and low-level cryptanalysis of Russian army, military air, and air defense communication traffic were among the principal processing operations conducted in the former establishment. Similarly, traffic analysis and low-level cryptanalysis of Russian naval, naval air, and air defense communication traffic were among the principal processing operations conducted in the latter. The units performing these operations were the only ones in the continental United States producing current communications intelligence on the Soviet Armed Forces, and hence were of the greatest value to the three Services in meeting their individual intelligence requirements. These units were integral parts of the aforementioned Army and Navy COMINT establishments which, by the terms of the Appendix to J.C.S. 2010, were explicitly included in the composition of AFSA.

9. This Appendix states:

"The AFSA shall consist of such facilities, units and military and civilian personnel of the armed forces which are OR MAY BE* used for, or engaged in communication intelligence or communication security activities, including the Headquarters, Army Security Agency (ASA), Arlington, Virginia, the Communications Supplementary Activity (CSAW), Washington, AND ANY COMPARABLE ORGANIZATIONS OF THE AIR FORCE*, and such other facilities, units

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and personnel as the Joint Chiefs of Staff may determine as necessary to fulfill the functions herein assigned."

No specific Air Force facilities or units were designated for inclusion in AFSA when it was formed because, at that time, the AFSS was in the initial phases of organization. The present AFSS processing operation, however, is identical in nature with those of the Army and Navy referred to in the preceding paragraph, and therefore the units conducting it should be regarded as falling within the meaning of the phrase "any comparable organizations of the Air Force."

10. As further evidence of AFSA's specific responsibility for the type of processing operation in question, J.C.S. 2010/6 (Enclosure "B") provides that:

"All AFSA Communications Intelligence (COMINT) activities (i) directed primarily toward the production of UNIQUE INFORMATION ESSENTIAL TO ONE OF THE SERVICES* for its successful prosecution of war or toward the provisions of technical support to one of the Services as required by subparagraph 3 c. (14) of J.C.S. 2010; or (ii) having as their principal product INFORMATION IN WHICH ONE SERVICE HAS A PRIMARY INTEREST*, will insofar as practicable, be carried out under the immediate direction of AFSA personnel of the Service concerned."

The minutes of the AFSAC meeting of 19 July 1949 show that in the discussion leading up to the approval of the foregoing provision "air-traffic-analysis problems" were cited as an example of problems to which this provision would apply.

11. The COMINT resources of the United States, in terms of critical personnel and facilities, are always so limited that it is impossible to process all useful material. There is, moreover, a practical limit to that portion of the total U.S. military resources which can be devoted to the COMINT effort. Any duplication of processing therefore reduces the amount of intelligence which can be produced. Losses from duplication may often be outweighed by gains in timeliness through COMINT processing at or near the point of intercept, and this kind of duplication is justified, but it is not the type of duplication under consideration herein.

12. Utilization of AFSS personnel and facilities now engaged in centralized COMINT processing at Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, toward fulfilling the Air Force's commitment to AFSA will result in an earlier increase in the

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quantity of Air COMINT available for all three Services than would otherwise be possible; and the discontinuance of this AFSS processing will eliminate needless duplication without decreasing responsiveness to the COMINT requirements of Air Force Commanders. The presence of AFSA in the continental United States, with its comprehensive coverage and extensive facilities, assures the provision of the maximum contribution that can be made available from centralized COMINT processing in the continental United States for the direct support of military operations. The highly developed network of communications within the continental United States makes it possible to provide as timely service from AFSA as from Brooks Air Force Base, Texas. Furthermore, participation in AFSA COMINT processing operations by Air Force personnel will provide essential on-the-job analytic training required to enable the field COMINT processing units of the AFSS to achieve readiness for effective wartime operations.

13. Although the duplication in question apparently presents a problem solely between AFSA and the Air Force, AFSA's relationships with the other two Services are also involved. It is probable that approval of the undertaking by one Service of unilateral operations in the field of centralized COMINT processing in the continental United States would lead to similar undertakings, with ever-increasing duplication of effort, by the other two Services. This is particularly likely in the field of Air COMINT since both of the other Services have responsibilities which generate vital requirements for Air Intelligence.

14. The Director, AFSA, is convinced that, if this problem is not resolved along the lines recommended by him, there will inevitably be three large Service agencies and one joint agency conducting centralized COMINT processing in the continental United States, with overlapping responsibilities, competing requirements, and reduced over-all effectiveness. The specific solution recommended will permit the operation and development of AFSA and the Service cryptologic agencies to proceed smoothly, in accordance with the intent of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in the best interest of the national defense.

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